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D I A L O G U E

WEST VIRGINIA V. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY: THE AGENCY’S
CLIMATE AUTHORITY
SUMMARY
On February 28, 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments for the landmark West Virginia v. EPA
case, involving the scope of powers delegated to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) through
the Clean Air Act. The Court’s decision will affect administrative law, and could have major consequences for
environmental law, particularly the Agency’s power to regulate greenhouse gas emissions and take action on
climate change. On March 1, the Environmental Law Institute hosted a panel of leading experts to discuss the
case, the arguments, and what form the decision may take. Below, we present a transcript of that discussion,
which has been edited for style, clarity, and space considerations.

Michael Gerrard (moderator) is the Andrew Sabin
Professor of Professional Practice at the Columbia Law
School.
Joanne Spalding is the Acting Legal Director and Chief
Climate Counsel at the Sierra Club.
Jill Tauber is Vice President of Litigation for Climate and
Energy at Earthjustice.
Keith Matthews is Of Counsel at Wiley Rein LLP.
Michael Gerrard: In 2015, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a set of regulations called the
Clean Power Plan.1 It was designed to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions from electric power plants mostly by reducing the use of coal. This reduction is essential if we’re going
to meet our climate targets. The Clean Power Plan required
each state to come up with a plan to reduce these emissions. That would usually involve not only making the
power plants themselves more efficient, but also changing
the mix of fuels used, procuring renewable energy, allowing emissions trading, and other actions.
The Clean Power Plan was immediately met with a barrage of litigation. The main argument was that in various
ways EPA was exceeding the authority that the U.S. Congress had given it under the Clean Air Act in issuing the
regulations. The cases went to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia (D.C.) Circuit,2 which refused
to stay the rules, and the D.C. Circuit set up a briefing
schedule. But in February 2016, before the briefs were due,
the U.S. Supreme Court surprised just about everyone and

1.
2.

Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources, 80
Fed. Reg. 64662 (Oct. 23, 2015).
West Virginia v. EPA, Nos. 15-1363 et al. (D.C. Cir. Oct. 29, 2015).
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issued a stay that blocked the plan so long as the litigation was proceeding.3 This was by a vote of 5 to 4, and no
explanatory opinion was issued.
The D.C. Circuit heard the argument in September
2016, but then in November, Donald Trump was elected
president. He had promised during his campaign to repeal
the Clean Power Plan, and after he took office, EPA did
repeal the Clean Power Plan and issued a new set of regulations called the Affordable Clean Energy Rule.4 The challenge to the Clean Power Plan became moot and the D.C.
Circuit never issued a decision on that case.
The Affordable Clean Energy Rule was also challenged
in court and on January 19, 2021, the day before President Trump left office, the D.C. Circuit issued a decision
in the case American Lung Ass’n v. Environmental Protection Agency.5 The court ruled that the Affordable Clean
Energy Rule and the repeal of the Clean Power Plan were
invalid because EPA under President Trump was relying
on an overly narrow construction of the relevant Clean
Air Act provision.
After President Joe Biden took office, EPA indicated
that it was not going to reinstate the Clean Power Plan.
Instead, it was going to come up with a new set of measures to reduce power plant emissions. While EPA was at
work developing the new measures, the Supreme Court
surprised everyone again by agreeing to review the January 19 decision from the D.C. Circuit. The Supreme Court
accepted four of the petitions for certiorari that had been
filed. Those were from the state of West Virginia, the state

3.
4.
5.

West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15A773 (U.S. Feb. 9, 2016).
Repeal of the Clean Power Plan, 84 Fed. Reg. 32520 (July 8, 2019).
No. 19-1140 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 19, 2021).
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of North Dakota, Westmoreland Mining Holdings, and
the North American Coal Corporation. These cases were
consolidated, and the Supreme Court heard arguments on
February 28, 2022.6
Let me now introduce our panelists. Joanne Spalding is
Sierra Club’s acting legal director and chief climate counsel. She oversees the Sierra Club’s litigation campaigns
nationwide, including managing the organization’s federal
and state climate litigation and regulatory work. She’s lead
counsel for the Sierra Club in all litigation arising from the
Clean Power Plan and the Affordable Clean Energy Rule.
Jill Tauber is the vice president of litigation for climate
and energy at Earthjustice. She leads the organization’s
litigation and legal advocacy to achieve 100% clean energy
and to curb climate change. Prior to joining Earthjustice
in August 2013, Jill was a senior attorney at the Southern
Environmental Law Center, where she led the organization’s energy-efficiency practice across the Southeast.
Keith Matthews has practiced environmental law for
more than 25 years. He has practiced in the private sector
and for more than 13 years was staff attorney and assistant
general counsel at the Office of General Counsel of EPA,
first in the Air and Radiation Law Office (ARLO) and
then in the Pesticides and Toxic Substances Law Office.
He has also served for four years as director of the Biopesticides and Pollution Prevention Division in EPA’s Office of
Pesticide Programs, and is of counsel with Wiley Rein LLP.
I’m going to pose a series of questions and invite the
panelists to respond. We’ll try to leave time for questions
from the audience.
Here’s my first question. Elizabeth Prelogar, the solicitor general, represented EPA. She argued that the Supreme
Court should not have taken the case at all because there is
no regulation pending. The Affordable Clean Energy Rule
is gone, and the Clean Power Plan has not been reinstated.
And those rules have not yet been replaced, so there’s nothing to review. All the Supreme Court could do is issue an
advisory opinion, which they’re not supposed to do. That
was the argument from EPA. There was quite a bit of discussion about whether the D.C. Circuit had revived the
Clean Power Plan. Joanne and Jill, what do you make of
the arguments on this issue and the questions that the justices have asked about those?
Joanne Spalding: I think that the solicitor general’s argument is right on target. The D.C. Circuit opinion did not
revive the Clean Power Plan because the litigants did not
ask for it to do that. In fact, the petitioners challenging the
Affordable Clean Energy Rule and the Clean Power Plan
repeal explicitly said in their briefs: We do not want you to
reinstate the Clean Power Plan. It wouldn’t be appropriate
at this point. The deadlines have passed. The emission targets are no longer relevant because the industry had already
achieved the 2030 goals back in 2019.
6.

West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency, Nos. 20-1530 et al. (U.S.
Feb. 28, 2022). A transcript of the oral arguments is available at https://
www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2021/201530_8ok0.pdf.
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In these circumstances, citing Small Refiner Lead PhaseDown Task Force v. EPA,7 the petitioners argued that the
better course is to vacate the unlawful replacement rule
and to remand to EPA without reinstating the Clean Power
Plan. The D.C. Circuit opinion needs to be read in light
of that. It doesn’t explicitly say anything about reinstating
the Clean Power Plan. In addition to that, and I think Jill
could talk about this as well, the Clean Power Plan is not
self-executing. So, even if it were in place, it would require
further rulemaking.
Jill Tauber: That’s exactly right. I thought the solicitor
general had excellent answers on this point. And in terms
of the Clean Power Plan not being self-executing, there was
a discussion related to this during the argument, in particular with Justice Steven Breyer, on this point of what the
D.C. Circuit did. What happens now? The reality is (1) the
Clean Power Plan never took effect, that’s clear, and (2) as
the solicitor general pointed out, the deadlines that were
in the original Clean Power Plan have passed. The emissions targets of the original plan have been met because
of market forces, and the changing nature of the industry
right now make it obsolete. And, of course, EPA has said
it’s committed to writing a new rule.
No litigant had asked them, in challenging the plan, to
preserve it. So, we have moved on from the Clean Power
Plan. This case is not about the Clean Power Plan. It would
not be revived with the decision here. As Joanne said, it’s
really important to understand the nature of how §111(d)
works. This is not a self-executing regulation that goes back
into effect and sets the emission standards. States would
have to come up with a plan in response to the guidance
that EPA puts out. So, we’re in a different place, a different
space, and EPA is working now on new regulations.
Joanne Spalding: Not only is it not self-executing, but
were EPA to begin to try to implement it, any action it
would take, the petitioners would be able to challenge that
action and they would be able to bring another lawsuit
challenging the underlying Clean Power Plan.
That underlying litigation has been dismissed as moot,
but they could use the after-arising grounds provision in
the Clean Air Act. It’s §307(d), and it includes the provision that, if there are grounds arising after the finalization
of a rule at any point, then one could challenge that rule,
based on what EPA is planning to implement.
A rule has never been in place. They are now putting it
in place. That’s an after-arising ground and we can challenge it. That’s why there’s an adequate legal remedy if for
any reason the Clean Power Plan would be brought back
into place. Any ruling by this Court on the Clean Power
Plan or this case in general would be advisory.
Michael Gerrard: During the oral arguments, the solicitor
general said that EPA would be issuing an advance notice
or would be issuing a proposed rule by the end of this cal7.

705 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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endar year and would be issuing the final rule a year later.
But the Supreme Court we expect to rule this May or June.
So, Keith, is there any procedural device by which EPA
could move more quickly in a way that would clarify the
status of the Clean Power Plan?
Keith Matthews: There’s a potential option that might be
available to EPA. Before I get into that, I’ll make two points.
The first point is that I think Jill and Joanne had excellent
responses to the overall question in general. I think that
everything they said is spot on. The second point is that I
think the solicitor general was a bit optimistic in terms of
her understanding of the rulemaking process. It’s not often
that you go from a proposal, to a closing comment period,
to a final rule in a year or less. Particularly a rule that is
very complex, and for which the Agency might in fact have
a voluminous number of comments.
But being optimistic is not to say that’s impossible. It’s
possible, but I would say not likely. Be that as it may, with
respect to your question, I would suggest that there is a
regulatory instrument. That if EPA finds itself in a position
where for whatever reason the Clean Power Plan has arisen
from the dead and now bears some semblance of existence
and the Agency wanted to formally close it, it could use an
administrative instrument called a direct final rule.
Direct final rules were pioneered by EPA. They were initially used in the context of a situation in which the Agency
needs to promulgate a completely noncontroversial rule.
The Agency doesn’t expect any comments on this particular action. So, what the Agency would do is publish simultaneously a final rule that basically purports to implement
the action within a certain time frame, and at the same
time publish a proposed rule in which it would explain why
it thinks the rule is noncontroversial and solicit comments.
What the final rule would say is: We publish this proposed rule simultaneously. We don’t expect to get any comments. If we don’t receive any comments, then we are going
to go forward in this time frame. The time frame was set
forth in the direct final rule and we’ll implement the rule
as it is written here. So, that’s a very convenient way to get
around what can quite frankly be an excruciatingly long
time period before doing a rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act as it has evolved to this day.
In fact, I was instrumental in a number of instances
where, rather than say the final rule will go final if we don’t
receive any comments, I actually had a couple of direct final
rules where I basically specified what comments we were
interested in. If we don’t receive comments that specifically
negate these conclusions, we’re going to go forward.
That’s a bit of an evolution of the direct final rule as it
initially has been pioneered by EPA. I would say the Agency
could do that here. If it shows that the Clean Power Plan
somehow, as I say, rose from the dead and were there as a
specter, the Agency can simply say: Listen, this is moot.
This serves no purpose.
To the extent that we as a matter of administrative law
need to formally revoke this or put it out of its misery,
we’re going to do so with this instrument. We’ll take comment on it, but I would suggest that the comment should
6-2022

be directed to specifically persuade the Agency that there
is a reason to keep the Clean Power Plan in effect. If the
comment doesn’t do that effectively, the direct final rule
goes forward.
Michael Gerrard: What would be the timing of that?
Would it be a 30-day comment period and then EPA acts
fairly quickly after that?
Keith Matthews: The Agency could do that. Quite
frankly, I think given the expertise of the Office of Air and
Radiation, they could probably write that in a month to a
month and a half. Take a 30-day comment period and say
it’s going to be implemented in 15 to 30 days based upon
the comments they receive or don’t receive. They can actually act very quickly.
Joanne Spalding: I think EPA has not taken that step
because it hasn’t perceived it to be necessary. Because in the
end, Keith, I think this goes to what you were saying—this
would essentially be, to the extent that it is necessary to
do this, we are just confirming that the Clean Power Plan
is not in effect. It has never been in effect and this is just
confirmation of that.
I do wonder the extent to which some of the justices
might have frustration with EPA and think the Agency is
somehow trying to deprive the Court of jurisdiction from
hearing this case. I don’t think that’s a legitimate concern
because I don’t believe the Court has jurisdiction. It is an
exercise of judicial activism to reach out and issue an advisory opinion in this context. But I have heard that concern.
Jill Tauber: I agree. I don’t think EPA perceived the need
to do that. Although it’s an interesting idea, I think EPA’s
plan is clear from the argument of the solicitor general;
they are working on the rule now, and they are going to
have a notice of proposed rulemaking out by the end of
the year.
The time frame the solicitor general gave was to expect a
final rule a year after that. So, the Agency is working right
now on it. There’s no rule on the books. The Clean Power
Plan is not in existence and they’re doing what they need
to do to get a §111(d) standard set. I think that that’s where
their focus and energy is and that’s what they represented
to the Court.
Keith Matthews: A couple of points to follow up. I want
to make clear that I wasn’t suggesting that EPA either
needs to do that or should do that. I was answering
Michael’s question.
The second thing I’ll say is there is a bit of danger there
because to my knowledge a direct final rule has never been
challenged. As I said, EPA pioneered this. I think other
agencies have used this. I think, as a matter of administrative law, that it meets all the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.
But it is a bit different from the normal rulemaking. I do
think agencies need to be careful to not go out on a limb
on this because you really don’t want to be in a situation
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where a court comes out and says: No. I don’t know where
you guys got this from. You shouldn’t be doing this. Don’t
ever do it again. Because, quite frankly, in the context of
a noncontroversial situation where the agency just wants
to get something done quickly and cleanly, it actually is a
very useful instrument. You don’t want to overuse it and
put it at risk.
Michael Gerrard: And if EPA were to do it, probably
the first court we would hear talk about it would be the
Supreme Court, who would be deciding in this case
whether or not they thought that that was valid, whether
they thought that was an effective action by EPA in closing
the door on the Clean Power Plan.
It’s entirely possible that the Supreme Court will get
to the merits, that they’ll conclude that they’re not being
asked to issue an advisory opinion, but they really want to
rule. And of course, the merits are mostly about §111 of
the Clean Air Act. A lot of that has to do with whether the
measures called for in the Clean Power Plan fit within the
best system of emissions reduction, which is what §111 is
talking about.
I’d like to invite you to talk about what you heard in
the oral argument on this issue, on the merits of §111, and
what you think of it.
Joanne Spalding: It was interesting and heartening that
nobody here is challenging the Court’s ruling in Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency,8 that EPA has
the authority and obligation to regulate greenhouse gases
under the Clean Air Act. And there was not a lot of discussion about the Court’s decision in American Electric Power
Co. v. Connecticut,9 in which the Court said that EPA is
the expert agency: that it is the agency with the expertise
to establish standards for greenhouse gas emissions from
this source category, fossil fuel-fired power plants, under
the Clean Air Act.
The question here was all about the way that EPA
decides to set these standards and what it looks at. The
statute instructs EPA to look at the best system of emissions reduction that has been adequately demonstrated.
That calls for an inquiry into the source category, the kind
of pollutant, and the nature of that pollutant. With this
particular source category, this “inside the fence line versus
outside the fence line” question and issue is whether EPA
can only require reductions at the plant itself. Those reductions tend to be both emissions control technologies and
improving efficiency. Or can it go beyond that and look
to the source category as a whole and look at how you get
reductions from this source category.
In this case, the electric sector is unique. There is no
other source category that is integrated the way that power
plants are. They are all part of a bigger system. They’re all
interconnected. So, reducing power generation at one plant
requires an increase at another plant to meet the needs,

8.
9.

549 U.S. 497 (U.S. 2007).
564 U.S. 410 (U.S. 2011).
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and vice versa. The question in this context is essentially
whether EPA can look at this source category and see how
it operates in the real world.
This is a global pollutant. Reductions in one place are
essentially fungible both in terms of the product and the
pollutant. That’s what EPA did. I think it’s really important
because the petitioners in this case seem to think that once
EPA does this, then the cat is out of the bag and it’s going
to apply to all these other source categories. It’s not. This
one is unique. I think that came across.
Some of the questioning by the Court that I thought
was quite interesting included the observation that the
stringency of that system of emission reduction and the
performance standard that arises from it aren’t necessarily
related. As attorney for the power company respondents,
Beth Brinkman, stated during oral arguments, the stringency is “orthogonal” to the question of whether it’s inside
the fence line or outside the fence line10 —whether it’s “to
the source,” or “at the source,” or “for the source”—because
you can have a very weak rule, as the Affordable Clean
Energy Rule is, based on inside the fence line measures.
But you could also have a much more stringent rule,
because EPA in the Affordable Clean Energy Rule essentially didn’t even set a standard or indicate what a standard
could be. They just provided lists of control measures, efficiency measures. They were not going to even look at really
the two most effective measures, because they thought
nobody is going to want to do those because they’re too
expensive and they’re going to trigger other permitting
requirements, which is completely beside the point, by the
way. So, it’s an incredibly weak rule. But you could also see
a really weak rule that would be outside the fence line that
would say we’re just going to require a little bit of generation shifting. And the justices, at least some of the justices,
really perceived that difference.
Michael Gerrard: Let me say a word for the people who
haven’t delved into §111. Section 111 requires EPA to designate certain source categories. The relevant one here is
fossil fuel power plants. The major question is: is “system”
referring to an individual power plant or is it referring to
the grid of which individual power plants are a part? If
you’re talking about the system, it increases the scope of
things that might be done to reduce the emissions.
Jill Tauber: I would add that the argument got into this
right off the bat, with Justice Clarence Thomas asking
whether the petitioners needed the “major questions doctrine” to prevail in this case. This was to attorney Lindsay
See for petitioners. And the answer was no. Then, it was
a dive right into the text. Some of this does come down
to that understanding of “system,” which is in the statute.
What’s not in the statute is “at the plant.” So, there’s a
really strong plain language argument here.

10. See oral arguments in West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency, Nos.
201530 et al. (U.S. Feb. 28, 2022), at https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_
arguments/argument_transcripts/2021/20-1530_8ok0.pdf (page 129).
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I was also struck by the exchange around this “inside
and outside the fence line” distinction. I believe it was Justice Elena Kagan who said something to the effect of it’s
not necessarily relational to a stronger, or weaker, or bigger,
or smaller impact. I think that’s really important if you’re
understanding the petitioners’ argument as being all about
whether it’s inside or outside the fence line.
The other thing I would add is if you’re looking again
at the text of the statute and in particular §111(a)(1), there
were questions about what the guardrails are and what the
limits are on that. That’s also clearly in the statute with
respect to considering whether the system of emissions
reduction is adequately demonstrated. There was a great
discussion of the briefs and discussion at the argument
about how this power generation thing works, how the
grid works, and whether these different tools were contemplated by the Clean Power Plan.
At least as reflected in the best system of emissions
reduction, is that happening? And the answer is yes. That’s
part of the reason why we are 10 years ahead in accomplishing the emissions targets. But the statute also speaks
to costs, reliability of the grid, all those factors that are in
the statute to provide limits as to what can be included in
the best system of emissions reduction. I thought that was
a good exchange and argument.
Michael Gerrard: One thing that became clear in the
argument is that several of the justices at least thought this
was anything but a sharp distinction between inside the
fence line and outside the fence line. Most of the prior discussion suggested it was a sharp dividing line. But it was
pointed out, for example, that EPA could impose really
severe limitations entirely within the fence line. They could
tell the coal-fired power plants they had to shut down or
they had to retrofit with carbon capture and sequestration,
which would not be economically feasible under any calculation to retrofit. But it was quite interesting to see that
previously envisioned sharp distinction kind of fall away.
One of the things that some of the justices seemed to be
concerned about, and Jill alluded to this, is what the guardrails are. What are the outer limits of EPA’s permissible
regulation here? That issue of course was important in the
2014 Utility Air Regulatory Group case,11 which concerned a
different program under the Clean Air Act, the new source
review program.
In that case, EPA said that the numerical numbers
requirement for what size of emission source requires a permit are way too low when it comes to carbon dioxide. If
it’s tons per year, that may be okay for sulfur dioxide and
other conventional air pollutants. But it’s way too small for
carbon dioxide. If you regulate carbon dioxide sources that
emit that little, you’re going to be regulating hundreds of
thousands or maybe millions of sources.
EPA didn’t want to do that. So, EPA instead issued a tailoring rule—a rule that greatly increases the threshold so

11. Utility Air Regulatory Group v. Environmental Protection Agency, 573
U.S. 302 (U.S. 2014).

6-2022

that it could regulate many fewer sources. But the majority opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia said EPA wants to
have the authority to regulate these hundreds of thousands
of sources. That’s going way too far. And it said that the
tailoring rule, this effort to reduce the number of sources
regulated, exceeded the authority of EPA.
So this issue of what are the guardrails, how far can EPA
go under the Clean Air Act, was something that some of
the justices were interested in. Any comments on whether
there are guardrails here, whether there are limitations on
how far EPA can go, or whether that’s necessary? Or is it
that what matters is how far EPA really wants to go or how
far is EPA trying to go, as opposed to how far could it
theoretically go?
Joanne Spalding: I think Jill started to set those out. First
of all, the system of emission reduction has to be adequately
demonstrated. I think the power companies’ briefs and the
argument really conveyed to the Court this is what we do.
There are also others. There’s an amicus brief from grid
operators explaining this. One could tell that the Court,
or at least most of the justices, had become familiar with
how the system operates. That “adequately demonstrated”
requirement is important.
The statute also requires EPA to take costs into consideration. I can’t remember which counsel pointed out that
this is not a balancing. This is not the cost-benefit analysis
that EPA does pursuant to an executive order that requires
them to do a cost-benefit analysis. This is an analysis of the
impact of the cost on the industry. So that is a guardrail,
because EPA cannot impose a rule that would have such
dramatic impact on the industry.
EPA can impose a rule that would shut down some
plants. There’s precedent that explicitly says that, and Congress contemplated—you can look at the legislative history
of the Clean Air Act—that sources would become obsolete, that new technologies would evolve, and that older
polluting sources would eventually close. It’s a technologyforcing statute. So it’s fine for some sources to shut down,
but it’s not fine for EPA to impose a standard that would be
disruptive to the entire industry and more than the industry could bear in terms of costs.
Then there’s an energy requirement in the statute. EPA
has to consider energy. So, they can’t threaten reliability. The statute explicitly tells EPA to look at the energy
impacts of their decisions. Those are really serious and
meaningful guardrails.
Jill Tauber: I don’t think we can say this enough. This is
happening. You have to look at the power sector. I mean
it’s striking to have the power sector arguing in favor of
EPA authority here to provide this regulation. I think that
reflects the reality of the industry right now, of what we’re
seeing in the power-sector space. We are seeing a transition
away from dirty resources. We are seeing a scaling up of
renewables. That’s what’s happening.
By the way, I don’t think it’s lost on any of us that the
timing of oral arguments in West Virginia v. EPA coincided with the release of the Intergovernmental Panel on
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Climate Change (IPCC) report.12 We have to transition. I
think that a lot of the argument was in the abstract, in part
because there is no regulation in place right now. That’s sort
of inherent in this and of course implicates all the justiciability questions. But we have a look at what’s happening,
which is this is an industry that is transitioning in the face
of evolving technologies, in the face of plummeting costs
of renewables. That’s in the background and was effectively
conveyed at oral argument.

broad program that is really regulating the electric sector and the grid, and not regulating pollutants. And now,
that’s really where their dispute fails. Of course, what EPA
is doing is regulating pollutants. And from my perspective,
I think that’s what EPA would say and has said. I think
that the concession about American Electric Power Co. v.
Connecticut, that petitioners made at oral argument, is
important because it is essentially an acknowledgement of
the role of §111(d).

Michael Gerrard: Jill mentioned Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency. One of the concerns that some
people had before the argument was that the Court might
take this as an opportunity to undo parts of that seminal case, that said EPA does have the authority under the
Clean Air Act to regulate greenhouse gases. In view of the
very minor discussion of that case, are you now feeling better and less worried that the Massachusetts parts of it might
be overturned?

Michael Gerrard: And the big question is what is the
scope of §111(d)? How far can EPA go? Did EPA go too far
in the Clean Power Plan or was it more restricted?
Joanne, you mentioned cap and trade. There was some
discussion of cap and trade in the oral arguments, but there
had also been some commentary that some of the justices
may have misinterpreted the role that cap and trade played
with the Clean Power Plan and its relationship to prior
legislative attempts. Such as the Waxman-Markey bill
of 2009,13 which was a cap-and-trade bill but was never
enacted. Any thoughts on that?

Jill Tauber: It was briefly discussed during oral arguments.
I think the discussion amounted to “are you challenging Mass v. EPA?” Answer, no. And are you challenging
American Electric Power, maybe a little less, no. We’re not
challenging the idea that EPA can regulate greenhouse gas
emissions from power plants—so those core holdings of
course are the law. I felt good about it going in and there
was not a lot of focus on that argument, I think for a good
reason. Because it’s so clearly the law and what EPA has
authority to regulate.
Michael Gerrard: Of course, part of the American Electric Power case primarily was about saying that the federal
common law of nuisance was displaced as to greenhouse
gas emissions because EPA had the authority to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions. This essentially confirmed the
Massachusetts case. There was also a statement in the American Electric Power case that §111(d) was available to EPA
to regulate sources. I didn’t hear a clear affirmation from
the petitioners that they still believe that that part of the
American Electric Power decision is still valid. But we’ll see
how that comes out.
Joanne Spalding: I think the holding of American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut depends on §111(d). That is
the provision that addresses emissions from existing power
plants. (Section 111(b) is the new source standards of performance.) That case was really explicitly about whether
§111(d) displaces federal common law. It would not make
any sense to read that case in any other way. And I think
that the petitioners in this case conceded that.
It was a question of, well, just because EPA is the expert
agency and it has this authority under §111(d), it doesn’t
have the authority to do this cap-and-trade program, this

12. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Working Group II,
Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability (Feb.
2022), available at https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/.
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Joanne Spalding: I thought that was a very important
point. There’s throughout this litigation an effort by West
Virginia, and the states aligned with it, and the coal industry private parties, to say what EPA is trying to do is something that Congress tried to do and didn’t. Therefore, that
somehow means that EPA doesn’t have authority to do it.
First of all, legislation that was never enacted should never
be relied upon to interpret a statute that was enacted. That’s
pretty basic in terms of statutory interpretation.
But the point was made that they are also completely
different kinds of provisions. Because this is just within
the electric sector, it’s just the sources that are subject to
regulation under the Clean Air Act that would be subject
to this standard. In that context, there are trading schemes
that are in the Clean Air Act that Congress has included
explicitly and blessed. So again, Brinkman’s point representing the power companies was that because trading is
in the statute, that’s one of the systems that’s adequately
demonstrated.14 It doesn’t have to be explicitly mentioned
in §111(d) because it’s on the menu. But it’s fundamentally
different than an economywide cap-and-trade program.
Michael Gerrard: Waxman-Markey would have established a mandatory economywide cap-and-trade program.
The Clean Power Plan did not. It provided that trading
was an option that could be used. It was an additional flexibility mechanism that would allow the power industry to
reduce its overall costs in achieving the requirements. As
was pointed out during oral argument, the text of §111(d)

13. American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009)
(commonly referred to as the Waxman-Markey Bill after its authors, Reps.
Henry A. Waxman (D-Cal.) and Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.)).
14. See oral arguments in West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency,
Nos. 201530 et al. (U.S. Feb. 28, 2022), at https://www.supremecourt.gov/
oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2021/20-1530_8ok0.pdf (page 104,
lines 8-14).
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says that states are to come up with plans like those of §110.
Section 110 is the section that calls on states to prepare
state implementation plans to achieve the national ambient
air quality standards.
But §110 explicitly says that market-based mechanisms,
such as cap and trade, are a permissible element of a state
implementation plan under the section. So, there was also
some discussion during oral argument about whether the
reference in §111(d) to §110 was just about the procedural
part, the part that each state has to come up with its own
plan, or whether it also included the substantive part such
as the allowance of market-based mechanisms.
I’m going to turn to the “major questions doctrine” in a
minute. But before we get to that, was there anything else
about the Clean Air Act that came up in oral argument
that any of you would have a comment on?
Joanne Spalding: The one thing I would say is that what
you just mentioned reminded me of the role of EPA versus
the role of the states, for example in the context of §111(d).
The Clean Air Act, as we know, is a cooperative federalism
statute. So it has roles for the federal government and the
state governments. What EPA does in this context with
existing sources is, rather than set a performance standard that directly applies to the regulated sources, it sets
a benchmark. It’s essentially a benchmark that states then
have to apply to the sources within that state.
Nothing about the Clean Power Plan (to the extent that
it’s even something that the Court should be considering),
nothing in that took away the states’ ability to do that.
That is a fundamental feature of §111(d), that the states
then apply the benchmark that EPA establishes.
There was this inconsistent position I think because
under the Affordable Clean Energy Rule, EPA said you
cannot go outside the fence line, and EPA is not doing that
in setting the best system of emission reduction, and states
and power companies cannot go outside the fence line
in applying that. I actually think that is right, that there
has to be symmetry. Because if EPA can’t consider certain
mechanisms that the states and power companies would
use to comply, then they might be establishing a weaker
rule than they otherwise would.
But what the power companies seem to be saying is oh,
no, no. Even though the Affordable Clean Energy Rule said
that, really states could fudge it in the implementation and
enforcement. I think it is the fundamental inconsistency
that draws attention to the disconnect between inside and
outside the fence line.
Michael Gerrard: One thing that is very important for
people to understand is that most of §111 is about new
sources of air pollution. For the new sources of air pollution, EPA can impose direct standards. They can specify
the technologies and the emission that the new sources
can emit. But §111(d) is this little exception that applies
to existing sources. And for the existing sources, EPA has
a whole lot less direct authority. There are restrictions on
what kinds of sources can be regulated under §111(d). And
if you are one of those kinds of sources, as you’ve been say6-2022

ing, it’s up to the states to come up with the implementation method.
One of the arguments against the Clean Power Plan was
that EPA was too prescriptive in what it told the states to
do. That the states in reality had fewer options to achieve
that, but still it is the states that were on the front line.
Keith, we have been talking generally about how the
Court has been approaching the statute and the timing of
this litigation and so forth. Do you have any observations
on the effect that these issues would have on administrative
law more generally, or on other agencies, or the way courts
approach administrative actions?
Keith Matthews: I do. And before I start, I will say that I
find this discussion to be very interesting and quite frankly
very enjoyable. It takes me back many years to these sorts
of very detailed discussions of the Clean Air Act that were
being held in ARLO back at the beginning of my tenure in
the Office of General Counsel.
When the Environmental Law Institute said they would
like for me to be a part of this panel, I said, you do understand I’m not a Clean Air Act lawyer? I was in ARLO for
some time but at that time, I was in fact the “R”—the
radiation attorney. I counseled the Office of Radiation and
Indoor Air on radiation protection standards that apply to
nuclear waste disposal facilities.
But I was part of the law office and I sat in many times
on very detailed discussions that were being held on very
particular provisions of the Clean Air Act. My memory
harkens back to listening to experts and to talking about
this with people who know the Clean Air Act probably better than anybody else in the world. But I did move on from
that, and I became a chemical regulation lawyer. From that
standpoint, that’s one reason why this case was of significant concern to me.
We just had oral argument. The Court hasn’t issued an
opinion. No one has any idea what the Court’s opinion is
going to be. It’s all well and good to sit here and do Monday morning quarterbacking and try to figure out what the
opinion is going to look at based upon what we’ve seen.
But the Court hasn’t even taken this into chambers yet, so
it will be interesting to see how it comes out.
For someone such as myself, this whole concept that
seems to have developed or be developing, one of the things
I found interesting was that there was a fair amount of discussion about “major questions” during oral argument. But
to my way of thinking, it doesn’t seem as if this is really a
fully fleshed out concept. There seem to be a fair number of
questions. Well, what is the major question? Is this a major
question? Or how do we get to a major question? Or is it
a clear statement versus a major question? How does all of
this play into the fabric of administrative law?
I will say this. My practice is based really at the edge
of technological development. I work with companies that
develop genetically engineered organisms that are regulated by agencies. Genetic engineering—say ag biotech—
is the genetic engineering of agriculture, either plants or
animals. There are far more genetically engineered plants
that have been developed today, but animals are coming.
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Insects are here. Nobody in their right mind thinks that
this enterprise should be unregulated. Obviously, we need
to have governmental oversight to ensure that they are
safe, effective, and a useful deployment of this technology.
But there’s also the question when you look at it—from
the ag biotech standpoint, you have EPA, the Food and
Drug Administration, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture—do any of those agencies have explicit statutory
authority to regulate genetically engineered organisms? I
think that’s an open question.
Now, with respect to EPA, I think EPA probably has a
very, very strong statutory basis in the pesticides context
under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act (FIFRA). FIFRA authorizes EPA to regulate any substance or mixture of substances that is intended to prevent,
destroy, repel, or mitigate a pest, or that alters the physiology of a plant. So, if you are developing a genetically engineered organism that is intended to have an effect such
that it prevents, repels, destroys, or mitigates a pest, or that
it alters the physiology of a plant, I think you can say EPA
has very strong statutory authority going forward. It didn’t
need any further direction from Congress to regulate these
sorts of organisms. The same I think would be true with
respect to, say, genetically engineered insects, if they are
being engineered for a pesticidal purpose.
I’m not so concerned about how administrative law may
evolve in that context with respect to EPA’s regulation of
ag biotech. But as you know, in your question, this is an
issue that is writ far larger than just EPA, so I think that
we have to be very careful. We as a society have to be very
careful in going down the pathway of taking the position
that Congress has to give an explicit delegation of authority
for an agency to have regulatory authority over a particular
commercial aspect or commercial enterprise, because technology waits for nothing.
It’s fascinating to me just how rapidly technological
development is occurring now. Take the Eighth Day of Creation.15 Going from Gregor Mendel to James Watson, Francis Crick, and Rosalind Franklin took 80 to 90 years. Well,
you go from there to actual genetic transformation with
transgenic organisms. That took 25 to 30 years. Now, we
are in the age of genome editing. Who knows what’s going
to come after genome editing, but I will guarantee you it
will be something.
The ability of humans to alter genetic structures is
not going to stop with genome editing. At the end of the
day, I worry that the administrative state is too ossified
and moribund to effectively regulate developing technology with the advent of—we talked about it earlier—the
Administrative Procedure Act. What agencies have to go
through in order to promulgate regulations takes so long.
There were times when I was at EPA where there were
regulations that were being contemplated. It would occur
to me that, by the time we get through with the required
rulemaking procedures, the rule will be obsolete. This

15. Horace Freeland Judson, The Eighth Day of Creation: Makers of
the Revolution in Biology (1979).

52 ELR 10436

technology will have moved on. Then, what do you do?
Well, I guess you start another rulemaking. That’s fine.
But by the time we’re ready to regulate what we now have
before us, that’s going to be obsolete as well. The new rulemaking is going to be obsolete.
Given the fact that the legislative state is something
less than efficient now, it would occur to me that it’s even
more time-consuming and less effective to get legislative
action than it is to get administrative action. I think that
we have to be very careful about going into a world where
we want to pull back the authority that regulatory agencies have to regulate at the far ends of technology when
in fact health, safety, environmental parameters, and concerns are paramount.
We want to make sure that the technology that we’re
developing is a technology that benefits mankind and,
looking at it from the FIFRA standpoint, does not have
unreasonable adverse effects. Obviously, there are adverse
effects to many sorts of advances, but we want to make sure
that the benefits of technological development outweigh
the potential adverse effects and potential detriments of it.
Michael Gerrard: Thank you for that. Of course, Congress has not passed a major new environmental law since
1990, but they amended the Toxic Substances Control
Act in 2016. If Congress has to act very explicitly on new
threats before administrative agencies can act, that’s a real
problem. We saw that arise just a few weeks ago in the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
vaccine case.16
Let me invite Joanne and Jill to comment on the discussion about the “major questions doctrine.”
Jill Tauber: Whatever you think about the doctrine, one
thing that was clear is that it’s really hard to do an analysis
when there’s no rule in place. This is an abstract question.
As it was presented and discussed, I thought that was a
pretty effective and compelling point that the solicitor general made for the government.
It was quite striking. There were so many questions
about what that doctrine is. Maybe just that precise question—what is it? What’s the daylight between this and nondelegation? Again, how do we know? What is the “what”?
That was the question by Justice Kagan as she described
one piece of what she understands this doctrine to be. That
sort of test though, is the agency outside of its lane?
I don’t know that we saw a clear view emerging about
the application of that doctrine to this rule in the abstract.
I do think it gets into a bit of talking about the magnitude
of the impact. That gets us to what we talked about earlier.
The inside/outside the fence line distinction is not a proxy
for major or not. That’s not the way. That’s not the reality of
control measures that you can apply inside versus outside.
It’s not a non-major versus major question. There’s just no

16. National Federation of Independent Business v. Department of Labor, Nos.
21A244 & 21A247 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2022).
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relationship there. And of course, that’s sort of the major
line of argument.
I’ll flag one interesting part of the argument that I
thought, with respect to major questions in particular,
was a discussion between the Chief Justice and the solicitor general on what goes first, the order of analysis. Do
you first assess whether there is an ambiguity in the statute? If there is, maybe the next step is what you do with
that ambiguity. You determine whether there is a sweeping
effect here or do you flip that order? I think that makes a
big difference. That was explored at least in some level of
detail in that exchange. That was interesting, but here I
don’t think major questions has a role. In this case, it did
get a lot of time during argument though. Obviously, it is
hard to say what the opinions will say on that.
Joanne Spalding: I found it interesting, too, that both
advocates for petitioners said we don’t need the “major
questions doctrine” in order for you to decide this case in
our favor. You can just look at the statute itself. I’m not
really sure what we’re doing with the “major questions
doctrine.” Their briefs started with long expositions of the
“major questions doctrine.” If you read those briefs, it’s not
clear that anyone has a clear understanding of or agrees
with what the doctrine is and how it applies.
I think that was reflected in the discussion at oral argument. Jill went into detail about when do you apply it and
to what do you apply it, and what kind of canon is it, is
it constitutional, is it linguistic, and so on. Justice Amy
Coney Barrett asked if it was a linguistic canon. And in
terms of what you apply it to, what in general we see is
that the source-specific inside/outside the fence line decision itself is not what the major question is. That’s a statutory limit.
I don’t know what the major question is. This isn’t simply a matter of this particular exercise of agency power, but
then what do you apply it to? Because, as they have already
said, EPA has the authority to exercise regulatory power
over this pollutant from these sources. I thought there was
a lot of lack of clarity there.
I also thought that as for the whole question of whether
EPA is doing this because Congress is so dysfunctional, I
don’t really think you need to go there. EPA is doing this
because it has the authority to do it and the obligation to
do it, in the statute that has been adopted, that Congress
did enact, and that the Supreme Court already has interpreted. Should there be any doubt about that, we can look
at EPA’s methane regulations that apply to the oil and gas
industry, which Congress recently disapproved in the context of the Congressional Review Act.17
Let me back up. The Trump Administration repealed
the methane regulations for the oil and gas industry in a
rule called the methane policy rule, and this Congress said
no, and they repealed that methane policy rule. EPA had
said they’re not regulating greenhouse gases under §111,
and Congress said, no, you need to. And that was under
17. Pub. L. No. 117-23 (June 30, 2021).
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§111(b). Congress said no because this is a predicate; first
of all, you need to regulate just because the statute requires
you to, and it’s a predicate for existing source regulation.
So, we have a very recent statement by Congress that this
is all appropriate.
It’s really unclear what this “major questions” discussion
is all about and why it’s necessary at all in this case. One
more point. There was this discussion in the oral argument
about looking at the regulatory action under review, asking
if it is “surprising” that this Agency would do this thing.
It’s clearly not surprising, given all that history, that EPA
would be regulating greenhouse gases from the largest stationary source category of greenhouse gases.
Keith Matthews: To build on what Joanne just said, EPA
is doing this because Congress in 1990, 30 years ago, was
not dysfunctional. Can anyone imagine a legislative accomplishment such as the Clean Air Act Amendment passing
today? That’s ludicrous. You can’t even think about that.
It’s like, well, when will pigs fly? So, there was authority
that was given to EPA in 1990 that under no circumstances
could happen now.
Michael Gerrard: This was I think the question Justice
Kagan was asking: are you surprised that the Agency is
acting? The Supreme Court was surprised when the Food
and Drug Administration tried to regulate tobacco. That
was part of the Williamson case.18 I’m not sure that people
should have been surprised when OSHA started regulating
masks and vaccines, but in any event, they used the “major
questions doctrine” there.
It was very interesting that Justice Thomas, his very first
question of See, the lawyer for West Virginia, was do you
need the “major questions doctrine” to win? And she absolutely said no. She thought that the case could be decided
on the statute. But the amount of airtime that the “major
questions doctrine” received during oral argument was very
large. We’ll see if the Court takes this as an opportunity
to again use the “major questions doctrine” to more clearly
define it because, as you said, there were several questions.
What exactly is the doctrine? What does it mean? How
does it relate to nondelegation? We’ll see.
There was a lot of attention in advance of the argument
to the “nondelegation doctrine”—the idea that the U.S.
Constitution gives sole legislative power to Congress, that
administrative agencies shouldn’t have too much discretion
at setting policy, and it would be exceeding the constitutional power of Congress for it to delegate too much discretionary policymaking authority to agencies.
Now, that’s a doctrine that has only been used twice by
the Supreme Court to invalidate a congressional action.19
Both of them were in 1935. But in some recent dissents
and concurrences and so forth, several of the justices have
18. Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S.
120 (1999).
19. See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (invalidating a law
governing hot oil); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating a fair competition code system).
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expressed interest in the “nondelegation doctrine.” There
was a lot of concern that this case might be the opportunity
for the Supreme Court to use that to swat back parts of the
Clean Air Act itself, not just what EPA was doing.
But it was quite interesting that there was very little discussion of the “nondelegation doctrine” during oral argument. It was interesting that Justices Neil Gorsuch and
Brett Kavanaugh said very little. They had very few questions. They were sort of seen as among those leading the
charge on the “nondelegation doctrine.” Do you have any
thoughts on the absence of nondelegation discussion during oral argument?
Joanne Spalding: I essentially agree with you, Michael,
that it didn’t look like that was anything that the advocates
were pushing strongly or that the Court was very interested
in. There were a couple of questions. Solicitor General See
said well, we’re looking at this as constitutional avoidance.
You don’t need to go to nondelegation because, if Congress
had delegated to EPA the authority to do the Clean Power
Plan, that would implicate nondelegation. But they didn’t
delegate that authority because there’s no clear statement as
to that preposition.
Of course, our position is the opposite, that Congress
did in fact delegate authority and it did so appropriately.
But it didn’t seem like, given Massachusetts v. EPA and
American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, that there was
really any traction to the argument.
Jill Tauber: I agree with that. It struck me that it was
largely discussed in the context of trying to explain the
“major questions doctrine” here, and what that would look
like by way of either comparison or how it could relate to
that. But I didn’t hear much on its own for good reason. I
think this is clearly constitutional and within EPA’s authority under the Clean Air Act, but I agree with your sense of
it not really taking up much airtime.
Keith Matthews: I’ll just say that I hope everyone is right.
Because in general, and just completely consistent with
what I was saying earlier, I think that it would be very,
very problematic if we have a situation where people believe
that we have to hew, as the originalists might want, too
closely to the original intent of people who put together a
document in 1787. In the year 2022, I would posit that the
world has changed a bit since then and that our system,
how we look at things, and how we look at governance,
needs to evolve as well. I’ll leave it at that.
Joanne Spalding: I want to point out that, based on what
Keith just said about looking at the original intent, nondelegation was not a thing at the founding of this country.
Profs. Julian Davis Mortensen and Nicholas Bagley did
a really in-depth historical analysis of the nondelegation

issue.20 I would really recommend that to folks who are
interested in that issue.
Michael Gerrard: There is some debate among constitutional scholars about that issue. I think we may see that
play out in some future litigation, but it doesn’t look like
this is the occasion that they’re going to use.
We have an audience question: how does this action
by the Supreme Court influence thinking about Congress
simply enacting a carbon tax, which seems much less subject to legal challenge?
Jill Tauber: There is a lot that Congress can do. I would
start with Build Back Better. I would start with the historic investment in climate and environmental justice that
passed the House, but that unfortunately has not passed
the Senate yet. I don’t view these as a zero-sum game. As
between different branches of government, we need congressional action. There again, I would point to Build Back
Better. We need EPA to continue to use its full authority
and really meet its statutory obligation to cut pollution and
protect our health.
Michael Gerrard: I absolutely agree with Jill that there’s a
lot that Congress could do if it wanted to and could do it
in an unambiguous way. That would clearly be within the
power of Congress. A carbon tax is one of those. Politically, that doesn’t seem to be in the cards right now given
our 50/50 split in the Senate. Congress could also resolve
the ambiguity. If there is ambiguity in the Clean Air Act,
there’s a lot that Congress could do. But Congress seems to
be paralyzed along these lines.
Another question: if the Court finds standing in this
case, what’s left of the Constitution’s Case or Controversy Clause?
Joanne Spalding: That’s a great question. I guess there’s an
upside for environmental litigants. Because if there’s standing here, I don’t know how they’re going to tell us we don’t
have standing in future cases. That’s a little bit of a flip
answer, but I think there’s a lot to it.
Michael Gerrard: If concern that an agency might do
something bad becomes the basis for standing, there are
a lot of people who would have standing in that kind of
instance. It may come down to the question of whether
the Clean Power Plan will spring back to life as a result of
the American Lung Ass’n case, due to the fact that the D.C.
Circuit said that EPA was misinterpreting the statute when
it repealed the Clean Power Plan.
Did that spring it back to life so that we can now challenge the Clean Power Plan even though, as you’ve all
pointed out, the Clean Power Plan is in every perspective
obsolete? The objectives have been met, the deadlines have

20. Julian Davis Mortenson & Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the Founding,
121 Colum. L. Rev. 277 (2021), https://columbialawreview.org/content/
delegation-at-the-founding/.
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passed. EPA doesn’t want to put it back. But I think that
they said it would have to be deemed to have sprung back
in order for this really to be a case and controversy.
Joanne Spalding: Even if it somehow technically had
sprung back to life, there’s nothing imminent about the
impact of it on any of the litigants in this case. Again, we
have to take further regulatory action to actually somehow
implement it. That would be subject to, as I said before, an
after-arising grounds lawsuit challenging the Clean Power
Plan itself.
Michael Gerrard: Another audience question. I was surprised by Justice Breyer’s hostility to some of EPA’s arguments on this question. Any reaction to that?
Jill Tauber: I don’t know that I heard hostility. I would
say there were discussions about what we were just talking about, the impact of the D.C. Circuit’s decision and
whether that somehow springs this back to life or not.
There was a lot of active exchange there in an effort to
understand fully what, if anything, is in place now. The
answer is nothing. And there was a lot of back and forth to
get there. That’s the one exchange, thinking about Justice
Breyer, that stuck out to me.
Michael Gerrard: Justice Breyer was asking a number of
focused questions on the text of the Clean Air Act, but I
wouldn’t characterize it as hostility. He was just focusing
on some of the words.
Another question. This morning, a student asked me if
I thought the Court could issue a narrow ruling without
crippling EPA. Do you see a narrow ruling? If so, along
what lines?
Joanne Spalding: A narrow ruling would be to say no
jurisdiction. I’m assuming that the student means a narrow ruling on the merits that would rule in favor of petitioners. For the Clean Power Plan, in establishing the best
system of emission reduction, EPA looked at all sorts of
ways to reduce emissions from power plants and landed
on this “generation shifting” concept. It involves generation shifting among sources that are regulated in the
Clean Air Act, under §111 of the Act. So, fossil fuel-fired
power plants.
Then also, generation shifting to non-emitting generators. They’re not sources. The most innovative thing that
EPA did in this rulemaking was relying on these other
producers of this product that are not polluting. That they
don’t emit any air pollution and so they are, therefore, not
a source under the statute. I would imagine some sort of
narrow ruling in which they should take another look at
that aspect, probably.
Michael Gerrard: Over the next several months, while
everyone is waiting for the Supreme Court to act on this
decision, what else can and should EPA be doing on climate change?
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Jill Tauber: On §111 power plants, I would say continue
to work on the draft rule. It is looking at it as a clean slate.
As stated, it’s working right now on that notice of proposed
rulemaking. We also have proposed methane regulations
out for new and existing sources.21
Let me expand this beyond EPA. It’s going to take a
whole-of-government approach. We have a commitment
to a whole-of-government approach and the government
should not wait for a decision to come down for further
action. There is plenty of work to do. And we’re correctly
focusing on EPA and focusing on the federal government,
but let me say that states continue to lead the way on climate. As lawyers and advocates, we need to continue to
push for climate progress at the local, state, regional, and
federal and global levels.
The work doesn’t stop. Our deadline is not a court deadline. It is not a statutory deadline. It is a planetary deadline.
We’ve got until the end of the decade. The IPCC brought
that into stark relief again to do all that we can do. So, the
work continues while we wait for a decision.
Joanne Spalding: I agree with all that. I would flag also
the motor vehicles regulations that EPA has issued and is
continuing to work on, both light duty and heavy duty.22
There are also regulations on aircraft23 and more on ships.
We need to be decarbonizing throughout our economy.
EPA has a role in that. Other federal agencies have a role in
that and states have a role in that.
One of the things that we do as advocates is look stateby-state and power plant-by-power plant. Utility commissions, even in states that have traditionally relied heavily
on coal-fired power plants, are finding that it’s a heavy lift
to keep these plants running. They are old. They’re dirty.
They emit all sorts of other pollutants. They are becoming
obsolete and are already obsolete in many cases. In order
to keep investing in these plants, ratepayers have to pay
for that.
There is some really interesting information that came
out in this past week leading up to the oral argument on
West Virginia rates, which have skyrocketed over the past
10 to 15 years because they are trying to continue to keep
these really dirty, expensive sources alive when their neighbors don’t even want to do that. Kentucky and Virginia
utility commissions are saying no, we don’t want our ratepayers to have to invest in these plants. There is a lot that
can be done at the state and local levels. Individuals who
are looking at their electric bills can see these plants are
no longer competitive and we need to be looking at other
sources, clean sources, of electricity generation.
Keith Matthews: I would add that this is not inconsistent
with what I was saying before about federal agencies and
regulatory agencies having authority to regulate at the edge
of technology and technological development. But also, it’s
21. 86 Fed. Reg. 63110 (Nov. 15, 2021).
22. 86 Fed. Reg. 74434 (Dec. 30, 2021) (light-duty vehicles); 87 Fed. Reg.
17414 (Mar. 28, 2022).
23. 86 Fed. Reg. 2136 (Jan. 11, 2021).
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not just regulatory action. I think that there’s a substantial
amount of progress that’s being made in the private sector.
The people are speaking. The people are basically saying
that we want a society that is less based on fossil fuels.
We want action and we’re trying to foment action in the
private sector to try to decarbonize the society. That’s just
as important.
Michael Gerrard: One of the most important things we
need to do to fight the climate crisis is to build out a massive amount of renewable energy to replace the coal. Ultimately, to replace most of the natural gas to allow us to
electrify our motor vehicle fleets and our buildings and so
forth. This is mostly being done by the private sector. There

are some federal subsidies that are involved, but it’s mostly
private companies that are wanting to build the wind and
solar. And when given the opportunity, we’re finding now
that they’re stepping up at a massive pace.
Just a couple of days ago, there was an auction on offshore sites off Long Island for offshore wind.24 It was a great
and astonishing amount of money. There was tremendous
interest by the private sector in building out the wind and
the solar that we need, especially given both the increased
demand and need for them and the plummeting cost. So
none of this depends on the Clean Air Act. The motor vehicles depend on the Clean Air Act, but parts of the Clean
Air Act that are not plagued by the ambiguities we see with
§111(d). So, EPA is moving forward with those as well.

24. Valerie Volcovici, U.S. Offshore Wind Auction Draws Record $4.37 Billion in
Bids, Reuters.com, Feb. 28, 2022, at https://www.reuters.com/business/
energy/us-offshore-wind-auction-nears-4bln-third-day-bidding-2022-02-25/.
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